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Abstract 
For over ten years, the U.S. Treasury has issued index-linked debt.  
Federal Reserve Board staff have fitted a yield curve to these 
indexed securities at the daily frequency from the start of 1999 to 
the present.  This paper describes the methodology that is used and 
makes the estimates public.  Comparison with the corresponding 
nominal yield curve allows measures of inflation compensation (or 
breakeven inflation rates) to be computed.  We discuss the 
interpretation of inflation compensation and its relationship to 
inflation expectations and uncertainty, offering some empirical 
evidence that these measures are affected by an inflation risk 
premium that varies considerably at high frequency.  In addition, 
we also find evidence that inflation compensation was held down 
in the early years of the sample by a premium associated with the 
illiquidity of TIPS at the time. We hope that the TIPS yield curve 
and inflation compensation data, which are posted on the website 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2008 and will be updated 
periodically, will provide a useful tool to applied economists. 
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1.  Introduction 
For over ten years, the U.S. Treasury has issued Treasury inflation-protected securities 
(TIPS)―debt securities for which the coupon and principal payments are indexed to the 
Consumer Price Index (CPI)―in addition to conventional nominal bonds.  However, for 
both nominal securities and TIPS, the Treasury issues only securities with particular 
maturities and coupon rates.  Thus, it is not possible to directly observe the nominal or 
real discount factors from these issues.   
In our previous paper (Gürkaynak, Sack and Wright, 2007), we estimated a 
smoothed nominal Treasury yield curve from the outstanding off-the-run nominal 
Treasury notes and bonds.  The results allowed us to compute the nominal discount 
factor, as well as to compute nominal Treasury yields and forward rates at any horizon.  
The first part of this paper is the sequel that fits a similar yield curve to outstanding TIPS.  
The results allow us to recover the real discount function as well as real Treasury yields 
and forward rates at a daily frequency back to 1999.  These data are available online and 
will be updated periodically. 
A comparison of the nominal and TIPS smoothed yield curves allows us to 
compute measures of inflation compensation―the rate of inflation that would give an 
investor the same return at maturity on a nominal security and a TIPS.  These measures 
are also known as breakeven inflation rates among financial market participants.  These 
yield curves (nominal, TIPS and inflation compensation) can be expressed in terms of 
zero-coupon yields, par yields, instantaneous forward rates, or n-by-m forward rates (that 
is, the m-year rate beginning n years ahead) for any n and m.   
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In addition to describing how we fit the real yield curve, the paper provides some 
discussion on how to interpret the resulting measures.  In the second part of the paper, we 
pay particular attention to the measures of inflation compensation in this regard.  These 
measures are driven to a great extent by investors’ expectations of inflation.  However, 
we argue that high-frequency movements in inflation compensation are considerably too 
volatile to represent revisions to rational expectations of inflation alone: Inflation 
compensation provides information about agents’ inflation expectations but its 
interpretation is complicated by inflation risk premia and the differential liquidity premia 
between TIPS and nominal securities.  We provide support of this view by analyzing the 
time series properties of inflation compensation and actual inflation and by comparing 
inflation compensation to survey respondents’ inflation forecasts.  Among other results, 
we show that inflation risk premia are related to the dispersion of survey forecasts. 
 Section 2 describes the mechanics of TIPS and briefly discusses the operation of 
the TIPS market.  Section 3 describes the yield curve fitting exercise.  Section 4 shows 
the results of our estimation, including an assessment of the fit of the TIPS curve.  
Section 5 provides some empirical analysis that is pertinent to the interpretation of 
inflation compensation.  Section 6 provides a proxy for inflation compensation that can 
be extended back to 1971.  Section 7 offers some concluding thoughts.  The data are 
posted as an appendix to the paper on the FEDS website. 
 
2.  The TIPS market 
A nominal Treasury security pays the holder a coupon twice a year and the principal 
value at maturity.  The coupon and principal value are fixed in nominal terms, and their 
value will be eroded over time by inflation.  For TIPS, on the other hand, the principal 
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payment is multiplied by the ratio of the reference CPI on the date of maturity to the 
reference CPI on the date of issue.1  If the maturity or issue date falls on day td  of a 
month with nd  days, then the reference CPI is  
1 1( 2) ( 3)t n t
n n
d d dCPI CPI
d d
− − +− + −  
where ( 2)CPI −  and ( 3)CPI −  denote the non–seasonally adjusted U.S. City Average All 
Items Consumer Price Index for the second and third months prior to the month in which 
the maturity or issue date falls, respectively.  The reason for the indexation lag is that the 
Bureau of Labor statistics publishes these data with a lag, with the index for a given 
month released in the middle of the subsequent month.2  Coupons are indexed in 
precisely the same way.3  In effect, this gives the TIPS an indexation lag of about 2½ 
months. 
 The first TIPS were issued in 1997.  Treasury initially sold five-, ten-, and thirty-
year TIPS.  The five-year TIPS was dropped in September 1998 and the thirty-year TIPS 
was dropped in October 2001.  Subsequently, the five-year TIPS was reintroduced and a 
twenty-year TIPS was added in May 2004.  As of the time of writing, there are 24 
outstanding TIPS with maturity dates ranging from 2008 to 2032. 
 Liquidity in TIPS was initially poor, and investor participation in the market was 
limited, either due to lack of familiarity with the asset class or in some cases institutional 
rules preventing these securities from being held.  Another important factor shaping the 
                                                 
1 Unless this ratio is less than one, in which case no adjustment is made.  This consideration became 
important for newly issued bonds during the deflation scare in 2003. 
2 Barr and Campbell (1997) discuss the indexation lag for UK index-linked bonds, which was eight months 
for bonds issued at the time of writing of that paper. 
3 Except that the constraint that the adjustment factor cannot be less than one does not apply to the 
indexation of coupons.  Thus a period of deflation could lower the coupon payments, but the cumulative 
adjustment to the principal can never be negative. 
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market was that, for a time, the long-term future of TIPS was unclear.  For example, in 
May 2001, the Treasury Advisory Committee of the Bond Market Association 
recommended that the TIPS program be discontinued.  However, the Treasury 
subsequently reaffirmed its commitment to the program, and liquidity improved 
substantially.  TIPS now represent about 10 percent of the outstanding supply of Treasury 
coupon securities and trading volumes in TIPS are now generally comparable to those on 
off-the-run nominal Treasury securities.4  More detail on the history and liquidity of the 
TIPS market is provided by Sack and Elsasser (2004). 
 
3.  Yield curve fitting 
This section begins by reviewing the fundamental concepts of the yield curve, including 
the necessary “bond math” for determining both nominal and TIPS yields.  It then 
describes the specific estimation method employed in this paper. 
 
3.1 Discount Function and Zero-Coupon Yields: Nominal and Real 
The starting point for pricing any nominal fixed-income asset is the nominal discount 
function, or the price of a nominal zero-coupon bond.  This represents the value today to 
an investor of a $1 nominal payment n years hence.  We denote this as ( )nomtP n .  The 
continuously compounded yield on this nominal zero-coupon bond can be written as 
 ( ) ln( ( )) /nom nomt ty n P n n= − , (1) 
and conversely the zero-coupon bond price can be written in terms of the yield as 
                                                 
4 According to an informal survey of dealers conducted by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in 2007, 
typical TIPS bid-ask spreads at maturities of five years or less were 1/2 to 1 tick (a tick is roughly 1/32nd of 
a percentage point of the price of the security).  At maturities around 10 years, the spread is 1 to 2 ticks.  At 
longer maturities, the spread is 4 to 10 ticks.  These spreads are a bit tighter than those observed in 2003 as 
discussed by Sack and Elsasser (2004). 
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 ( ) exp( ( ) )nom nomt tP n y n n= − . (2) 
Here and throughout, yields and coupon rates are expressed in percentage points; for 
example, 5 percent is written 0.05.   
In the same way, we consider a real discount function, or the price of a real zero-
coupon bond.  We denote this as ( )realtP n .  This represents the value today to an investor 
of a $ t n
t
Q
Q
+  payment n years hence where tQ  denotes the price index at time t.
5  The 
continuously compounded nominal yield on this bond is ln( ) /
( )
t n
real
t t
Q n
Q P n
+ .  The 
continuously compounded real yield on this bond can be written as 
( ) ln( ( )) /real realt ty n P n n= − .  Our convention henceforth throughout this paper is that we 
shall discuss real bonds in terms of their real yields and nominal bonds in terms of their 
nominal yields. 
 
3.2 Par yields and forward rates. 
As discussed in our earlier paper (Gürkaynak, Sack and Wright, 2007), there are a 
number of ways of expressing the information in the nominal yield curve in addition to 
continuously compounded zero-coupon yields.  One way is to solve for the coupon rate 
which ensures that the price of the bond today will equal its maturity price.  This is 
known as the par yield and is the market convention used to describe bond yields.  Par 
yields are quoted with semiannual compounding because coupons on U.S. Treasury 
securities are paid twice per year.  An alternative way of describing the yield curve is in 
terms of forward rates.  We can solve for continuously-compounded instantaneous 
                                                 
5 In this discussion, we are abstracting from the indexation lag. 
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forward rates at all horizons.  Or we can solve for m-year forward rates beginning n-years 
hence.6 
All of these concepts apply to both TIPS and nominal securities, giving us two 
parallel sets of yields.  In this paper, let ( )nomtf n  and ( )
real
tf n  denote the n-period ahead 
nominal and real instantaneous forward rates, and let ( , )nomtf n m  and ( , )
real
tf n m  denote 
the m-year nominal and real forward rates beginning n years hence, respectively.  In 
addition, we will use , ( )p nomty n  and 
, ( )p realty n  to denote the n-year nominal and real par 
yields, respectively.  
  
3.3  The Nelson-Siegel-Svensson yield curve 
Rather than fitting a spline-based, nonparametric curve, we impose some structure on the 
shape by imposing a parametric form that fits the TIPS yields remarkably well.  The 
benefit of the parametric approach is that it smoothes through the idiosyncratic 
movements in yields of individual securities and accurately represents the underlying 
shape of the (real) discount function.  
The yield curves that we fit assume that the instantaneous forward rates (whether 
real or nominal) follow the functional form  
 0 1 1 2 1 1 3 2 2( ) exp(- / ) ( / ) exp(- / ) ( / ) exp(- / )tf n n n n n nβ β τ β τ τ β τ τ= + + + . (3) 
This structure was proposed by Svensson (1994) and is an extension of the functional 
form earlier used by Nelson and Siegel (1987).  We refer to it as the NSS (Nelson-Siegel-
Svensson) functional form.  The original Nelson-Siegel functional form is a special case 
                                                 
6 To further confuse matters, the m-year forward rates can be expressed as either zero-coupon forward rates 
or par forward rates. 
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of (4) in which 3 0β = .  Integrating these forward rates gives us the corresponding zero-
coupon yields: 
 1 1 20 1 2 3
1 2
1 1 2
1 exp( ) 1 exp( ) 1 exp( )
( ) [ exp( )] [ exp( )]t
n n n
n ny n
n n n
τ τ τβ β β βτ τ
τ τ τ
− − − − − −
= + + − − + − − . (4) 
The assumed functional form of the forward rates (and hence yields) has some 
intuitive characteristics.  As discussed in more detail in our earlier paper, it allows the 
forward rate curve the flexibility to start and end at estimated parameters, and to have a 
hump-shaped pattern in-between.   The Nelson-Siegel functional form effectively allows 
for only one hump, whereas the Svensson curve allows for two humps.  Below we will 
show that allowing the second hump is important to capture convexity effects at longer 
horizons.  The estimated parameters will determine the magnitude and location of these 
humps. 
 Given any candidate set of parameters, we can use (4) to solve for the nominal 
and real discount factors.  With these discount factors, we can construct a predicted price 
for any Treasury security (nominal or real) with a given maturity date and coupon rate by 
considering it to be a bundle of zero-coupon securities, one corresponding to each 
payment on the security, with the value of each payment determined by the appropriate 
discount factor.  We then estimate the nominal and TIPS yield curves by numerically 
choosing the set of parameters so as to minimize the weighted sum of squared deviations 
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between actual and predicted prices.  The weights are the inverse of the durations of each 
individual security.7  
The ranges of maturities available for estimation over our sample are shown 
graphically in Figure 1, which takes the same form as a figure reported by Bliss (1996).  
The date is shown on the horizontal axis, the remaining maturity is shown on the vertical 
axis, and each outstanding TIPS security is represented by a dot showing its remaining 
maturity on that date.  For example, a dot at a ten-year maturity in 2000 denotes a 
security that is to mature ten years later, in 2010.  The remaining maturity of that security 
will be traced out by a downward-sloping line, with the maturity shrinking as time passes. 
 As noted before, the Svensson curve allows for two humps, while the original 
Nelson-Siegel functional form allows for just one hump.  The second hump is however 
not well identified unless we have enough long-term securities.  As discussed in 
Gürkaynak, Sack and Wright (2007), for the nominal yield curve we used the restricted 
functional form up to 1980, but then we switched to the Svensson parameterization after 
that point because more long-term nominal Treasury securities became available to 
estimate the shape of more distant forward rates.  Following similar reasoning, and given 
the maturities available as shown in Figure 1, for the TIPS yield curve we used the more 
restricted functional form up to the end of 2003, and we switch to the Svensson 
parameterization after that point as the issuance of 20-year TIPS helped the estimation. 
TIPS with less than 18 months to maturity are dropped from the estimation of the 
TIPS yield curve, because the effect of the indexation lag makes the prices of these 
securities erratic.  TIPS with remaining maturity between 18 and 24 months are 
                                                 
7 Weighting price by inverse duration converts the pricing errors into yield fitting errors, to a first 
approximation.  Fitting inverse-duration-weighted prices rather than yields is preferable because it is 
computationally much faster and delivers essentially the same yield curve. 
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downweighted linearly for smooth behavior of the short-end of the curve over time.  All 
other TIPS are included in estimation of the TIPS yield curve, as there is no particular 
liquidity premium in on-the-run TIPS securities.  (By comparison, for the nominal yield 
curve we excluded on-the-run and first-off-the-run securities because they often 
command a premium for liquidity that pushes them away from the yield curve.)  
 
3.4 Inflation Compensation  
Having computed nominal and TIPS yields, it is straightforward to solve for rates of 
inflation compensation, or what market participants typically refer to as breakeven 
inflation rates.  These rates are defined as the inflation rates which, if realized, would 
leave an investor indifferent between holding a TIPS and a nominal Treasury security. 
The formula is simplest for the continuously compounded zero-coupon inflation 
compensation rate: 
( ) ( ) ( )nom realt t tn y n y nπ = − . 
It simply states that the cumulative amount of inflation needed to equalize the return on 
nominal and real zero-coupon securities, expressed as an annual inflation rate on a 
continuously-compounded basis, is given by the difference in the nominal and real yields.  
Similarly, the continuously compound instantaneous forward inflation compensation rate 
is as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( )f nom realt t tn f n f nπ = − . 
For par securities, the semi-annually compounded inflation compensation rate is as 
follows: 
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,
,
( )1
200( ) 200( 1)
( )1
200
p nom
t
p
t p real
t
y n
n
y n
π
+
= −
+
. 
To be more precise, inflation compensation represents the increase in the index 
ratio required to equalize the returns on the securities.  Because of the indexation lag in 
the construction of TIPS, this will not correspond exactly to the rate of inflation required 
over that period.  Instead, it represents the rate of inflation required from about 2½ 
months before today’s date to about 2½ months before the maturity date.  Because the 
inflation rate over part of this period (up to the published figure) is known, this 
indexation lag effect can produce swings in short-term inflation compensation unrelated 
to expected future inflation.  In addition, note that the inflation compensation measure 
will embed any predictable variation in CPI inflation, including that from CPI seasonal 
patterns and swings in energy prices.8  These factors can introduce some substantial 
variation in short-dated inflation compensation, an issue that we return to below. 
  
4.  Yield curve results 
Using the above methodology, we estimate the U.S. TIPS yield curve using daily data 
from January 1999 to the present.  Our underlying quotes on individual TIPS are kindly 
provided to us by Barclays Capital Markets.9 
 As an example of the results, Figure 2 shows the estimated TIPS yield curve on 
June 1, 2005.  The solid line is the continuously compounded par yield curve, the open 
                                                 
8 Ejsing, Garcia and Werner (2007) study the seasonal effect in euro zone inflation compensation and show 
that for very short maturities the magnitudes involved are non-trivial.  
9 We are not permitted to release the underlying data.  However, the estimated yield curve is publicly 
available and regularly updated, as described in the text. 
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circles are the actual quotes on all outstanding coupon securities included in the 
estimation, and the crosses are the predicted yields for these issues.10   
As can be seen, the yield curve generally does an impressive job fitting the entire 
cross-section of TIPS issues with a function of only six parameters.  The success at fitting 
TIPS yields on this date is repeated throughout the sample.  Figure 3 shows the average 
absolute yield prediction error in different maturity buckets over time.  As can be seen, 
all of the errors are quite small over the entire sample.  The largest fitting errors tend to 
be seen in the very shortest (2-5 year) and longest (20-30 year) maturity buckets, and 
even there the typical errors are only a few basis points.  
 Figure 4 returns to the specific date considered in Figure 3, only now showing the 
zero-coupon TIPS yield curve and the instantaneous forward rates at all horizons, as well 
as the corresponding measures for inflation compensation.   In June 2005, the Federal 
Reserve was in the middle of a tightening cycle.  The TIPS yield curve sloped up at that 
time, reflecting expectations for the continued removal of monetary policy 
accommodation and perhaps a  real-interest-rate risk premium that was increasing in 
maturity.  Most likely because of convexity effects, the upward slope of the zero-coupon 
TIPS yield curve tapers off at long horizons and eventually turns down.  Accordingly, the 
forward rates turn down earlier and much more sharply.  Inflation compensation slopes 
down at short to intermediate maturities, perhaps reflecting expectations for a moderation 
in headline inflation, but then slopes up at intermediate and longer maturities, presumably 
owing in part to an inflation risk premium that is increasing in maturity. 
                                                 
10 That is, the crosses are consistent with the par yields shown in the line.  They are not exactly on the par 
curve because the outstanding securities are not trading precisely at par. 
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 The history of five- and ten-year zero-coupon and instantaneous forward TIPS 
yields is shown in Figure 5.  As can be seen in the figure, in 1999, TIPS yields were high 
reflecting in part the premium that investors demanded to induce them to hold these 
assets that were then quite illiquid.  TIPS yields subsequently declined sharply, as 
liquidity improved and the FOMC eased monetary policy to combat the most recent 
recession.  The FOMC began to tighten monetary policy again in the middle of 2004.  
Five-year zero-coupon TIPS yields began to rise, as expected, but ten-year instantaneous 
forward TIPS yields fell over 2004 and remained quite low through 2006.  The fall in 
distant-horizons forward (nominal) rates over this period was famously termed the 
“conundrum” by former Fed Chairman Greenspan and is discussed in Kim and Wright 
(2005) and Backus and Wright (2007).  Here we see the same phenomenon in real rates.   
The behavior of five- and ten-year zero-coupon and instantaneous forward 
inflation compensation over the sample is shown in Figure 6.  Inflation compensation was 
quite low in 1999, reflecting the poor liquidity of TIPS relative to nominal securities (the 
counterpart of the high TIPS yields at that time).  Breakeven inflation rates tended to drift 
higher through 2003, a pattern that is most apparent in the ten-year forward rate, in part 
because of the improvement in TIPS liquidity.  In addition, investors may have become 
more concerned about upside inflation risks by early 2004, in light of the updrift in 
realized inflation, the rebound in growth, and the accommodative stance of monetary 
policy.  Since 2004, inflation compensation has remained in a fairly narrow range at all 
horizons, with forward rates drifting down some. 
One measure that is of particular interest is the five-year forward five-year 
inflation compensation rate (also known as the five-year five-year forward breakeven 
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inflation rate), because it has been explicitly mentioned by a number of Fed policymakers 
in their speeches.  The behavior of this measure is often taken as a gauge of the Fed’s 
inflation-fighting credibility.  Policymakers seem to look to this measure to help judge 
whether near-term inflation pressures are working their way into longer-term 
expectations.  The concern is that such leakage would create a more persistent inflation 
problem that would then be costly to reverse.  If the Fed maintains its credibility, then the 
forward inflation compensation measure should be relatively unresponsive to information 
about the near-term outlook.11  This measure, which can be derived from our yield curves 
as a par forward rate over a five-year horizon, is shown in Figure 7.  It shares many of the 
same properties of the instantaneous forward rates discussed above.  
 The yield curve estimated above is intended to be flexible enough to capture the 
general shape of TIPS yields while smoothing through some of the factors that might 
affect individual securities.  One such factor is the seasonality of CPI.  Because TIPS are 
indexed to non-seasonally adjusted CPI, the yield on an individual security will reflect 
the expected seasonal change in the index ratio between the quote date (or more 
specifically the settlement date) and the maturity date of the security.  This has two 
effects; it causes some variation in yields over time as the seasonality of the quote date 
changes, and it causes some variation across individual securities.  For example, TIPS 
securities that mature in April tend to have higher yields and lower breakeven rates than 
those maturing in January, because the CPI seasonal corresponding to the April maturity 
                                                 
11 Below we make the case that forward inflation compensation rates cannot simply be read as inflation 
expectations because of the presence of an inflation risk premium and a liquidity premium.  This provides 
some room for the measure to vary without raising concerns among policymakers.  However, risks to the 
inflation outlook are also important and a large enough rise would  be concerning to a central bank, 
regardless of whether it was driven by inflation expectations or investors’ assessment of considerable 
upside inflation risks.  
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is much lower than that corresponding to the January maturity (reducing the price of the 
April TIPS and hence raising their yield).  At longer maturities, the impact of the 
seasonal pattern gets amortized over a longer period and is negligible, but it can be 
important at shorter horizons.  The Svensson yield curve, however, smoothes through this 
variation across maturity months.  This feature is desirable for our curve, as it is designed 
to extract information about macroeconomic expectations and risks.12 
 The appendix that accompanies this paper provides data on zero-coupon yields 
(continuously compounded), instantaneous forward rates (continuously compounded), 
and par yields (coupon-equivalent) for TIPS securities at a range of maturities as well as 
the five-year forward par five-year TIPS yield (coupon-equivalent).  The maturities 
included span from 5 to 20 years for the period through 2004, and from 2 to 20 years for 
the period since then (when we use the more flexible specification, as discussed above).  
Yields at maturities below 5 years are not reported before the end of 2004 because, as can 
be seen in Figure 1, this would at times have entailed extrapolating the TIPS yield curve 
outside of the range of maturities that were actually outstanding.  Meanwhile, yields for 
maturities below 2 years are never reported because the shortest maturity TIPS are 
excluded from our smoothed yield curve on account of the indexation lag and other near-
term carry considerations.   
The data are daily and are available back to January 4, 1999.  The appendix also 
includes estimates of the six parameters of the Svensson TIPS yield curve and the zero-
coupon, instantaneous forward and par rates of inflation compensation, and the five-year 
forward five-year rate of inflation compensation.  This appendix is posted on the website 
                                                 
12 One might design a different curve, or append this one with additional analysis, if the main purpose is to 
gauge the relative value of specific securities.  
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http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2008/200805/feds200805.xls, using the 
mnemonics described in Table 1.  We intend to update the data regularly, as a resource 
for academic researchers and financial market practitioners. 
 
5.  The behavior of inflation compensation  
Armed with the TIPS yields and inflation compensation rates constructed above, we can 
now conduct some empirical analysis that is relevant for interpreting these measures.  We 
focus specifically on inflation compensation rates. 
 Inflation compensation is a mechanical calculation of the level of inflation which, 
if realized, would give investors the same return on TIPS and nominal Treasury 
securities.  It is often used as a measure of inflation expectations, but this is correct only 
if investors are risk-neutral and there is no liquidity premium.  In this section we provide 
several strands of analysis supporting the notion that variation in the inflation risk 
premium and the liquidity premium constitute an important part of the behavior of 
inflation compensation. 
 
5.1 The volatility of forward inflation compensation rates 
In this subsection we address whether distant-horizon forward rates of inflation 
compensation can be viewed simply as measures of the long-run expected level of 
inflation, or the implicit inflation target of the central bank.  If a ten-year forward rate of 
inflation compensation really is the rational long-run expectation of inflation, then it 
should be a martingale.  Otherwise, the expectation of the long-run expectation of 
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inflation tomorrow would differ from the long-run expectation of inflation today, which 
is impossible by the law of iterated expectations.  
 Table 2 shows the standard deviation of one-day and one-, three- and six-month 
changes in ten-year ahead forward instantaneous inflation compensation.  The standard 
deviation of a one-day change in forward inflation compensation is a bit less than 5 basis 
points.  If this ten-year forward inflation compensation really is a martingale, then the 
volatility of k-period changes must be k times the volatility of one-period changes.  This 
can be tested by a variance ratio test.  Accordingly, Table 2 also reports variance ratio 
statistics testing the hypothesis that ten-year forward inflation compensation is a 
martingale.  The test statistic is *( )z q  in the notation of Lo and MacKinlay (1998), which 
means that it is the variance ratio statistic that allows for time-varying conditional 
heteroskedasticity.  Under the martingale hypothesis, this test statistic has a standard 
normal asymptotic distribution.  However, we see in Table 2 that the test rejects in the 
left tail, meaning that the volatility of longer-term changes in inflation compensation is 
too small relative to the volatility of daily changes for inflation compensation to be a 
martingale.13 
 Stock and Watson (2007) find that an unobserved components model with 
stochastic volatility provides good forecasts for inflation.  The model is a univariate 
model in which inflation is the sum of a martingale permanent component and a 
martingale difference sequence transitory component.  The variance of the innovations to 
both components is allowed to be time-varying.  At any point in time, the forecast of 
                                                 
13 It is well known that the distribution of this test statistic can be quite far from being standard normal in 
small sizes (Lo and Mackinlay, 1988 and Richardson and Stock, 1989).  However, those papers find that 
the left-tail percentiles of the small sample distribution are above their asymptotic counterparts.  Under 
these circumstances, the fact that we reject in the left tail is all the stronger evidence against the martingale 
hypothesis. 
 17
future inflation at any horizon is equal to the estimated permanent component.  And the 
volatility of that forecast is the volatility of the permanent component.  Stock and Watson 
find that the volatility of the permanent component was high in the early 1980s but has 
fallen since then and is now about 19 basis points per quarter.  The standard deviation of 
one-day changes in ten-year inflation compensation is 4.8 basis points.  So if we interpret 
ten-year inflation compensation as a long-run inflation measure and appeal to the 
martingale property that this implies, then the volatility of quarterly changes in long-run 
inflation expectations should be 38 basis points per quarter, which is twice as big as 
Stock and Watson estimate.  We conclude from these exercises that inflation 
compensation is too volatile at high frequency to represent inflation expectations alone. 
 
5.2 Comparison to surveys of inflation expectations 
Twice a year, in March and October, Blue Chip Economic Indicators collects long-range 
forecasts of CPI inflation five-to-ten years hence from a large number of professional 
forecasters.  It seems worthwhile to compare the survey results with average five-to-ten 
year forward inflation compensation in each of the survey months.  After all, at least at 
shorter horizons, surveys have been remarkably accurate predictors of future inflation 
(Ang, Bekaert and Wei, 2007).   
Figure 8 plots the time series of the mean survey forecast and five-to-ten year 
forward inflation.  Inflation compensation has been far more volatile than survey 
expectations, and the two have no consistent relationship with each other.  Since 2002, 
survey expectations have been consistently below inflation compensation, suggesting that 
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the inflation risk premium (which pushes inflation compensation up) now outweighs the 
TIPS liquidity premium (which pushes inflation compensation down). 14,15 
 It is also of interest to study the association between inflation compensation and 
investors’ uncertainty about inflation.  Macroeconomic uncertainty is very hard to 
measure and we are not aware of any survey asking respondents for density forecasts at 
long horizons. But, the dispersion of long-horizon survey responses may serve as a crude 
proxy for uncertainty.16  The Blue Chip surveys report a simple dispersion measure for 
their long-horizon survey questions, which is the difference between the average of the 
ten highest forecasts and the average of the ten lowest forecasts.  Figure 9 plots the time 
series of this dispersion measure for CPI and five-to-ten year forward inflation 
compensation.  There is a moderately strong positive association between these two 
variables.  In fact, the correlation between the survey dispersion and five-to-ten year 
forward inflation compensation in the survey months is 0.71, which seems reasonable if 
inflation compensation represents in part a risk premium: compensation for uncertainty 
about future inflation.   
In 2003 and 2004 both the survey dispersion and forward inflation compensation 
increased and subsequently declined.  Arguably, during the period when the federal funds 
rate was kept at 1 percent to forestall the possibility that the U.S. might enter into a 
                                                 
14 Our nominal yield curve does not include on-the-run issues and so our inflation compensation numbers 
are not distorted by the large and time-varying liquidity premia associated with these securities.  
Nonetheless, to the extent that TIPS are still less liquid than off-the-run nominal securities, inflation 
compensation may be pushed down by a premium to compensate investors for the differential liquidity of 
nominal and TIPS securities. 
15 This pattern has implications for the cost of TIPS issuance.  In the early years of the TIPS program, TIPS 
were more expensive than nominal Treasury securities in terms of their expected servicing cost to Treasury, 
as argued by Sack and Elsasser (2004).  However, with breakevens moving above expected inflation, the 
relative costs have been reversed for securities issued more recently, as pointed out by Roush (2007). 
16 Gürkaynak and Wolfers (2007) show that for several macroeconomic data releases the uncertainty and 
heterogeneity of beliefs are positively correlated but that these correlations are not very high.  The 
dispersion of survey answers is therefore likely to capture some element of underlying uncertainty, but is an 
imperfect measure.  
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deflationary period, investors were quite uncertain about the long-run inflation level and 
accordingly demanded a relatively big inflation risk premium.  As monetary policy 
accommodation was removed, uncertainty and inflation risk premia fell.  Declining 
uncertainty about inflation is one of the candidate explanations for the “conundrum” 
proposed by Backus and Wright (2007).17  
  
5.3 Take-aways on inflation compensation  
The evidence presented in this section suggests that it would be a mistake to interpret 
every change in inflation compensation as a pure change in inflation expectations.  
Rather, as an accounting equation, inflation compensation represents inflation 
expectations plus an inflation risk premium minus the TIPS liquidity premium.  The 
liquidity premium moves slowly over time (as will be shown below).  However, the 
evidence above suggests that the inflation risk premium may exhibit considerable 
volatility even over relatively short horizons. 
Variation of the inflation risk premium should not be surprising, especially 
considering that the expectations hypothesis of the nominal term structure is routinely 
rejected (meaning that nominal term premiums vary over time).  It is intuitive to think of 
the inflation risk premium as depending on uncertainty about inflation.  This is consistent 
with the positive association between inflation compensation and the dispersion of survey 
forecasts of inflation.  It may also help to account for the apparent excess volatility of 
                                                 
17 To be sure, it is hard to argue that there has been a big change in inflation uncertainty in the U.S. over 
recent years.  But this is not true in the UK where granting operational independence to the Bank of 
England seems to have resulted in a substantial reduction in inflation uncertainty.  Fortunately, the UK has 
a large and liquid indexed debt market making it ideal to test the view that inflation compensation is also 
driven importantly by inflation uncertainty.  Beechey (2007) studied the association between distant-
horizon forward inflation compensation and survey-based inflation uncertainty measures in the UK and 
found a strong positive relationship. 
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inflation compensation relative to rational expectations of inflation.  A consideration that 
may further boost the volatility of inflation compensation is a positive correlation 
between the level of inflation and uncertainty about inflation (as found by Friedman 
(1977) and Ball (1992)), in which case an increase in inflation expectations would also 
cause the inflation risk premium to rise and hence prompt an outsized movement in 
inflation compensation.18   
 Even though inflation compensation conflates investors’ inflation expectations 
with the price and quantity of inflation risk, it is nonetheless a very useful indicator of 
investors’ inflation concerns.  Moreover, it is the only inflation indicator that is available 
at high frequency, which makes it quite useful in a range of applications.  To obtain 
model-based decompositions of TIPS-based inflation compensation into its inflation 
expectation, risk premium and liquidity premium components, one would have to turn to 
a structural yield curve model, such as the affine model presented in D’Amico, Kim and 
Wei (2007). 
 
6.  Backcasting inflation compensation  
The TIPS yield curve and the associated inflation compensation term structure have many 
applications for practitioners and researchers, but their usefulness is limited by the 
relatively short sample over which data are available to study their properties.  Indeed, 
TIPS have been available for only about a decade, while nominal Treasury securities 
have a much longer history.  But the longer history of nominal yields raises an interesting 
                                                 
18 The inflation risk premium need not necessarily represent inflation uncertainty alone.  If, for example, 
foreign central banks exogenously decrease their demand for longer-term nominal Treasury securities 
(perhaps due to changing exchange rate policies) then that may increase nominal yields and raise the 
inflation risk premium even without any increase in inflation uncertainty.   
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possibility: If the relationship between nominal yields and inflation compensation has 
been relatively stable over time, it should be possible to backcast inflation compensation 
using the observed relationship between the nominal yields and inflation compensation in 
the recent sample.  That is, we can find the combination of nominal yields that best 
proxies a particular breakeven measure over the period for which we have TIPS, and we 
can then compute this proxy over a much longer sample.  
Before doing the backcasting, we take a related intermediate step and focus on the 
factor structure of the nominal yield curve and its components—the TIPS and inflation 
compensation curves.  It is well known that the term structure of nominal yields can be 
well explained by a small number of principal components.  These factors are often 
interpreted as having to do with macroeconomic factors such as the business cycle, 
inflation prospects, and the steady-state level of real rates.  Most of the variation in 
nominal yields can be explained by the first principal component which, given the factor 
loadings, can be interpreted as the level of yields.  Including two more principal 
components—commonly interpreted as the slope and curvature, respectively—accounts 
for nearly all of the variation in yields. 
 Using month-end data since January 2003, Table 3 shows the fraction of the 
variance in zero-coupon nominal yields at annual maturities from two to twenty years 
that can be explained by the first few principal components.  Of course, the fact that our 
Svensson yield curves are tightly parameterized functional forms with just 6 parameters 
guarantees that the smoothed yields will have a low-dimensional representation, but the 
nominal yield curve fits remarkably well so it seems very likely that the same would be 
true for a spline-based curve as well.  The first principal component (that we think of as 
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the level) explains 61 percent of the variation in nominal yields, and the first three factors 
together account for essentially 100% of the variation.19  Thus, any information contained 
in the nominal yield curve (such as the information contained in inflation compensation) 
should be well represented by the first three factors. 
As an aside, we run the same principal components decomposition on the TIPS 
yields and inflation compensation at the same maturities.  Interestingly, the same result 
holds, with almost all of the variation accounted for by several factors.  Indeed, the first 
factor alone explains even a greater share of the TIPS yields and inflation compensation 
than it does for the nominal yields.  Thus, the parsimonious representation of the nominal 
yield curve seems to hold up once one digs into the various components of the nominal 
yields.  This is a topic that we hope to return to in future research.  
If nominal Treasury yields in fact embed much of the information contained in 
inflation compensation, we can create a proxy by regressing inflation compensation on 
the first three principal components of the nominal term structure.20  Specifically, we do 
so for the five-year forward five-year inflation compensation rate shown earlier in Figure 
7.  However, the exercise is complicated by the poor liquidity of TIPS in the early years 
of the TIPS program.  Accordingly, we estimate the regression using month-end data that 
starts only in 2003.   
The R-squared from this regression is 79 percent, indicating a fairly tight 
relationship between inflation compensation and the nominal term structure.  Of course 
the relationship is not perfect.  Note that an R-squared too close to unity would imply that 
                                                 
19 Note that in the short sample used, only two factors are required to explain nearly all of the variation in 
the yield curve.  The third factor seems more important when the sample is extended back before the 1990s. 
20 This same exercise was conducted in a Macroeconomic Advisers commentary entitled “The Transition of 
the Fed Chairman” from August 27, 2005.   
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inflation compensation (and therefore the TIPS yield) can be perfectly synthesized from 
the nominal term structure and therefore that TIPS are redundant securities.  The R-
squared we find is high enough to let us confidently assert that there exists a strong time 
series relationship between the nominal yield curve and inflation compensation, but it is 
not so high as to diminish the relevance of TIPS.  
In the backcasting exercise we used the coefficients from the regression and the 
longer history of nominal term structure data to obtain fitted five-to-ten-year forward 
inflation compensation back to 1971.  This sample covers both the period before index 
linked securities existed (before 1997) and the period in which TIPS liquidity was poor 
(1997 to 2002).  Figure 10 shows the actual and fitted inflation compensation series. 
One result that emerges from this exercise is an estimate of the liquidity premium 
for TIPS over the period from 1999 to 2002.  As can be seen from the figure, actual 
inflation compensation was well below fitted inflation compensation, consistent with 
investors demanding a higher yield on TIPS (relative to nominal yields) to compensate 
them for the poor liquidity of these securities.  This estimated liquidity premium is big, 
but it is also very inertial.  Indeed, throughout this period the higher-frequency 
movements in inflation compensation tracked those of its fitted value, suggesting that 
these movements were not generated by the liquidity premium.  The liquidity premium 
instead remained big in the early years and then gradually faded by 2003.  
 The assumption that the relationship between hypothetical inflation compensation 
and nominal yields has been stable over the period since 1971 is a very strong one, and 
the fitted values from this regression should be treated as only a crude proxy for inflation 
compensation, especially in the early part of the sample.  Nonetheless, the behavior of the 
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fitted value of inflation compensation over the longer period since 1971 appears 
qualitatively reasonable.  It rose in the late 1970s and exceeded 6 percent in the early 
1980s, presumably reflecting both a high level of longer-term inflation expectations and a 
sizable inflation risk premium.  It declined sharply in the mid 1980s and drifted lower 
over the next 15 years, likely because investors were revising down both their inflation 
expectations and the compensation that they demanded for inflation risk over that period.  
In recent years, inflation compensation has shown much more stability, remaining in a 
tight range by historical standards.  This likely reflects the fact that longer-term inflation 
expectations have stabilized and that the inflation risk premium has remained relatively 
low (and thus has not swung over a big range).     
 
7.  Conclusion 
In this paper we have estimated the U.S. TIPS yield curve using an approach that is 
simple and parsimonious.  The methodology is quite effective at capturing the general 
shape of the yield curve while smoothing through idiosyncratic variation in the yields of 
individual inflation-protected securities.  The estimated yield curve can be expressed in a 
variety of ways, including zero-coupon yields, par yields, and forward rates.  And it can 
be compared to the corresponding nominal yield curve to obtain estimates of inflation 
compensation. 
Having the real yield curve should provide tremendous benefits to our efforts to 
better understand the behavior of nominal yields.  It allows us to parse nominal yields and 
forward rates into their real rate component and their inflation compensation component.  
These two components may behave quite differently, in which case simply looking at a 
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nominal yield might mask important information.  Accordingly, we hope that our TIPS 
yield curve will be useful to researchers.  It is to this end that we have made the full 
dataset available to be downloaded from http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2008/2
00805/feds200805.xls and will update it regularly. 
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Table 1: Description of the series in the data appendix 
 
Series Compounding 
Convention 
Mnemonics Maturities 
Reported (max) 
TIPS yields    
Zero-coupon Continuously Comp. TIPSYXX All integers 2-20 
Par Coupon-Equivalent TIPSPYXX All integers 2-20 
Instantaneous forward Continuously Comp. TIPSFXX All integers 2-20 
One-year forward Coupon-Equivalent TIPS1FXX 4, and 9 
Five-to-ten-year forward Coupon-Equivalent TIPS5F5  
Parameters N/A BETA0 to  
TAU2 
N/A 
Inflation compensation    
Zero-coupon Continuously Comp. BKEVENYXX All integers 2-20 
Par Coupon-Equivalent BKEVENXX All integers 2-20 
Instantaneous forward Continuously Comp. BKEVENFXX All integers 2-20 
One-year forward Coupon-Equivalent BKEVEN1FXX 4, and 9 
Five-to-ten-year forward Coupon-Equivalent BKEVEN5F5  
Notes: XX in each case denotes the maturity in years.  For example, TIPSY10 denotes 
the ten-year zero-coupon yield.  The one-year forward rates XX years hence denote the 
one-year forward rates beginning XX years hence.  For example, TIPS1F09 is the one-
year forward rate from nine to ten years hence.  The parameters are labeled BETA0, 
BETA1, BETA2, BETA3, TAU1, and TAU2, corresponding to the equations in the text.  
Note that the parameters BETA3 and TAU2 are restricted to zero in the earlier part of the 
sample, as discussed in the text. 
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Table 2: Volatility of changes in ten-year forward inflation compensation at selected 
horizons 
 
Horizons Standard Deviation 
(Basis Points) 
Variance Ratio Statistic 
One day 4.8  
One month 18.5 -2.35** 
Three months 26.6 -2.40** 
Six months 32.1 -2.08** 
Notes: This table shows the standard deviation of one-day and one-, three- and six-month 
changes in the ten-year instantaneous forward rate of inflation compensation.  They are 
computed assuming 22 days per month.  The variance ratio statistic is the 
heteroskedasticity robust test statistic of Lo and MacKinlay (1988) and has a standard 
normal asymptotic distribution.  *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 
percent significance levels respectively. 
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Table 3: Variance Share Accounted for by Principal Components 
 
m Nominal Yields TIPS yields Inflation 
Compensation 
1 61.10 72.65 77.72 
2 99.90 99.62 98.63 
3 99.98 99.89 99.64 
Notes: This table shows the fraction of the variance in zero-coupon nominal yields at 
annual maturities from two to twenty years that is accounted for by the first m principal 
components of those yields (cumulatively).  The same information is included for TIPS 
yields and inflation compensation.  The data are end-of-month from January 2003 to June 
2006, inclusive. 
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Figure 1: Outstanding TIPS Securities 
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Figure 2: Par TIPS Yield Curve on June 1, 2005 
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Figure 3: Average Absolute Yield Prediction Errors by Indicated Maturity Bin 
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Figure 4: Zero-Coupon and Forward Rates on June 1, 2005 
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Figure 5: TIPS Yields 
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Figure 6: Inflation Compensation 
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Figure 7: Five-to-ten Year Forward Inflation Compensation  
 
Notes: Forward par inflation compensation. 
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Figure 8: Five-to-ten Year Forward Inflation Compensation & Blue Chip Forecasts  
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Figure 9: Five-to-Ten Year Forward Inflation Compensation and Blue Chip 
Forecast Dispersion 
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Figure 10: Actual and Fitted Five-to-ten Year Forward Inflation Compensation 
 
 
